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IV.

CUm~NAL PROCEDURE

The Fourth Circuit'sNew Limitations on Struck Jury
Venires: United States v. Ricks
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees every
person accused of a crime the right to a trial by an impartial jury.' One
means of insuring an impartial jury is the exercise of peremptory challenges
against the trial venire. 2 The trial venire consists of the individuals that a
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to federal
and state courts. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The Duncan Court held
that the right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases is a fundamental right guaranteed to an
accused by the United States Constitution. Id. at 149. Accordingly, the Duncan Court held
that for states to guarantee due process of law to a person accused of a serious crime, the
states must recognize the right of an accused to a trial by jury. Id. An accused's right to a
trial by jury, however, does not extend to every crime. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.
373, 379 (1966). The Cheff Court held that crimes which cannot carry a punishment of
imprisonment for longer then six months and which qualify as petty offenses do not entitle
an accused to a jury trial. Id. at 379-80. In Baldwin v. New York the United States Supreme
Court found that the classification of an offense as a petty offense or a serious offense
determine's whether a trial by jury is necessary. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970).
The Baldwin Court concluded that courts cannot deny an accused the right to a jury trial if
the possible punishment resulting from the accused's trial can exceed six months imprisonment.
Id. at 69. Additional criteria such as the nature of the crime that a court charges an accused
with violating and the size of the potential fine that the accused can receive, affect whether
an accused must receive a jury trial. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRMUnAL
PROCEDURE, § 21.1(b) (1985) (discussing potential necessity for jury trials when prosecution
charges accused with status crimes such as driving under the influence of alcohol, and
shoplifting).
The common law mandates that a trial jury must be impartial. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 722 (1947) (noting that jury trial is unfair automatically unless jury is impartial).
Additionally, there are specific procedures in the American criminal justice system to protect
the impartiality of juries. See generally LAFAvE & IsRAL at §§ 21.1-.4. (explaining that one
procedure courts employ to protect jury impartiality is allowing parties' to exercise peremptory
challenges). See United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 297, 298-99 (1827) (noting
that peremptory challenges allow parties to remove individuals from jury venires when venire
members are predjudiced against removing party). Another procedure is the right of both the
defense and the prosecution to challenge any member of a trial venire for cause. See III
A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 15-2.5 (1982) (explaining that removal for cause is
ability of parties to strike any individual from trial venire if individual is unfit for duty
according to statutory requirements or individual is permanently biased). Another procedure
courts use to protect jury impartiality is the right of the defendant and the prosecutor to
challenge the entire venire of jurors. See Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 449
(1871) (allowing defendant to challenge successfully entire trial venire on procedural grounds).
Finally, both sides of a criminal procedure may challenge the impartiality of a judge. See
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1927) (noting that defendant may challenge bias of
trial judge).
2. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1720 (1986) (stating that
American criminal procedure traditionally acknowledges peremptory challenges as one means
of assuring unbiased jury); United States v. Swain, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (explaining
function of peremptory challenges); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887) (describing
peremptory challenges as extremely effective means of excluding unfit men from jury-box);
Meade v. State, 85 So.2d 613, 615 (Fla. 1956) (en banc) (explaining purpose of peremptory
challenges).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:707

court has assembled as potential jurors for an accused's trial.' A peremptory
challenge is the traditional right of a party to strike any person from the
trial venire for any reason. 4 The United States Supreme Court has declared
that the right to exercise peremptory challenges against a trial venire is one
of the most important rights of an accused individual.5 One of the procedures
that courts employ to enable a party to exercise peremptory challenges is
the struck jury selection process. 6 In the struck jury selection process, a
trial judge presents a list of the individuals in the trial venire to each side
of a criminal action.7 The trial judge then allows each side to peremptorily

3. BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY 1395 (5th ed. 1979) (explaining that term "venire" referred
to common law writ directing the local sherriff to assemble specific number of qualified men
to serve as potential jurors for particular defendant's trial. Id.; State v. Frotten, 114 Vt. 410,
46 A.2d 921, 924 (1946) (discussing common-law origin of term "venire").
4. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965). The United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Swain began with an extensive analysis of the history and power of peremptory
challenges. Id. at 212-22. The Swain Court granted much deference to the analyses of
Blackstone. Id. at 212. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, ComtatNrARiEs ON

m LAW OF EN.LAN 353

(15th ed. 1809). Blackstone wrote that the peremptory challenge is an arbitrary and capricious
right to challenge a juror for any cause. BLACKSTONE, supra at 353. The Swain Court noted
further that according to Blackstone, parties must exercise peremptory challenges with full
freedom or the purpose of the challenge fails completely. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.; BLACKSTONE,
supra, at 353. The Swain Court also relied upon the district court's discussion of peremptory
challenges in State v. Thompson. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386,
206 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Ariz. 1949). In Thompson the Arizona Supreme Copurt held that the
essential charcteristic of a peremptory challenge is that parties may exercise the challenge
without stating a reason, and without any inquiry by the courts as to why the party exercised
the challenge in the way that the party did. Thompson, 206 P.2d at 1039. Recently, however,
the Supreme Court has restricted a party's traditionally unfettered right to exercise peremptory
challenges. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1725 (1986). In Batson the
Supreme Court held that a defendant can establish a prima facie case of prosecutorial
discrimination on evidence that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to exclude all
members of a minority group from a jury. Id. at 1722-1723. The Batson exception, however,
only applies to cases where the defendant alleges racial discrimination as a result of theprosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 1 at 849
(explaining Supreme Court's decision in Batson to place restrictions on exercise of peremptory
challenges).
5. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (discussing traditional legal
sanctity of defendant's right to peremptory challenges).
6. See State v. Brunson 101 N.J. 132, 141, 501 A.2d 145, 151-52 (1985). In Brunson
the Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed a number of procedures that federal courts employ
to allow parties to exercise peremptory challenges in criminal actions. Id. One of the procedures
that the New Jersey court discussed as a valid jury selection process was the struck jury
system. Id.; see also Swain v. Alabama 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965) (noting that struck jury
system is historically valid system for exercising peremptory challenges); Brown v. New Jersey,
175 U.S. 172, 177 (1899) (noting that struck jury system can vary in procedure within same
state without affecting parties right to peremptory challenges); United States v. Pointer, 151
U.S. 396, 411-12 (1894) (recognizing for first time that struck jury system is legitimate way
for parties to exercise peremptory challenges); United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796, 798 (2d
Cir. 1981) (stating that struck jury selection process is one of most effective ways that parties
can exercise peremptory challenges).
7. See e.g., Pointer, 151 U.S. at 396 (illustrating court's tender of venire list to
prosecutor and counsel for defense).
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challenge any person in the venire by striking the person's name from the
venire list.' The United States Supreme Court has held that courts must
condemn any system of jury selection that impairs the ability of a party to
fully exercise the party's peremptory challenges. 9 In United States v. Ricks'0

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the
question of whether a court that conducted a struck jury selection without
limiting the size of the trial venire impaired the defendants' ability to fully
exercise the defendants' peremptory challenges."

In Ricks a grand jury indicted the defendants for engaging in a conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics.'2 At the trial of the Ricks
defendants, seventy-five veniremen reported for jury duty. 3 The district
court for the Eastern District of Maryland designated sixty-six of the seventyfive veniremen as the group from which the district court would select the
active jurors for the Ricks trial.' 4 The district court noted that the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure required the district court to permit the
8. See generally, III A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 15-2.6(b) (1982) (explaining
that in struck jury selection process courts allow each party to exercise peremptory challenges
against individuals in venire by striking individuals names from venire list. Id.
Federal and state statutes explicitly control the number of peremptory challenges that each
side may exercise. See e.g., MD. RutLs § 4-313(a). The Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide that when a defendant faces a single charge carrying a punishment of life imprisonment
or death, the defendant may exercise 20 peremptory challenges and the State may exercise 10.
Id. If a defendant faces a single count which carries a punishment of possible imprisonment
for more then 20 years, but less then life, the court must allow the defendant 10 peremptory
challenges and the State 5. Id. All other crimes, except those for which the Maryland Rules
do not provide a penalty, entitle each side to 4 peremptory challenges. Id. Compare MD.
RuLEs with FED. R. Cium. P. 24 (b). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that
if a defendant faces a punishment of death, both the defendant and the State receive 20
peremptory challenges. FED, R. CalM. P. 24 (b). If the defendant faces a punishment of
imprisonment for more than one year, then the Federal Rules allow the defendant 10 peremptory
challenges, and the State 6. Id. For all other crimes, the Federal Rules allow a defendant to
exercise 3 peremptory challenges and allow the State to exercise 3 peremptory challenges. Id.
9. United States v. Pointer, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
10. 776 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1985), 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane), cert. denied
sub nom. King v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 650.
11. United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 458-61 (4th Cir. 1985), 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.
1986) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 650.
12. Id. at 458. In Ricks the Fourth Circuit convicted defendants Ricks, Carter, Moffatt,
Rogers, Lindsey, Frisby, Roberts, and King, of engaging in a conspiracy to possess and
distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of section 846 of Title 21 of the United States Code.
Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (codifying federal penalty for attempting to or conspiring to
comit violations of Chapter 13, subcapter 1, of United States Code). The prosecution also
charged the individual defendants with racketeering and conducting continuous criminal enterprises. Ricks, 776 F.2d at 458. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982) (codifying federal penalties for
racketeering and conducting continuous criminal activities).
13. Ricks, 776 F.2d at 458. In Ricks the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court
most likely called seventy-five people to form the initial trial venire because other trial judges
planned to select jurors for their trials from the individuals that remained in the venire after
the Ricks jury selection.Id. at 458-59.
14. Id. at 458. The district court designated the remaining nine veniremen as the group
from which the court would select the alternate jurors. Id.
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defendants to exercise a minimum of ten peremptory challenges against the
individuals in the Ricks trial venire. 5 An Assistant United States Attorney
asked the district court to explain from which part of the active juror venire
list the court would select the names of the twelve active jurors.' 6 The
district court responded that, although the court could not give a definite
answer at that time, the court's general policy of selecting names from a
venire list was to start near the top of the list and work down.'7
The district court conducted voir dire and excused nine people from
the active juror venire for cause.' After voir dire, the district court gave a
list of the fifty-seven individuals remaining in the active juror venire to
each side, instructing each side to exercise its peremptory challenges against
the names on the list.' 9 The defendants concentrated their peremptory
challenges at the top of the active juror venire list, exercising all of their
challenges within the first twenty-seven names on the list. 20 The government
exercised its peremptory challenges throughout the list, exercising only three

15. Id. FED. R. Caim. P. 24(b). See supra note 8 (explaining that if criminal defendant
faces punishment of imprisonment for more than one year, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
allow defendant 10 peremptory challenges, and allow State six). The crime of conspiring to
possess and distribute narcotics is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 21
U.S.C. § 846. (1982). A conviction under § 846 can result in the maximum penalty or fine
allowed for a conviction of the crime that was the object of the attempt. Id. The predicate
crimes of possessing or distributing cocaine or heroin carry maximum sentences of life
imprisonment, and substantial fines. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982). Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure further provides that when a criminal trial contains more than one
defendant, the court may grant the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit
the defendants to exercise the additional challenges seperately or jointly. FED. R. Cam. P.
24(b). In Ricks, the district court allowed the defendants to exercise jointly a total of twelve
peremptory challenges against the active juror venire. Ricks at 458. Finally, Rule 24(b) states
that a court must allow the defendants and the government additional peremptory challenges
if the court uses alternate jurors; one challenge for up to two alternate jurors, and two
challenges for up to four alternate jurors.Id. The district court in Ricks conducted the alternate
juror selection by informing both sides that the alternate jurors would come from the last
eight names on the venire list. Id. The district court allowed each side to challenge two
individuals in the alternate venire, which left four individuals to act as the alternate jurors.
Id.

16. Ricks, 776 F.2d at 459. The Fourth Circuit in Ricks noted that the prosecuting
attorney probably asked the district court about the order of selection due to the large size of
the venire. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, did not cite any example of a standard venire
size that the district court normally employed before Ricks. Id.
17. Id. The actual discussion between the Assistant Attorney General and the judge was:
[Prosecution]: Your Honor, may I assume that we'll be-or the Court will be picking
from the top of the list?
The Court: Well, of course I can't tell at this point, as far as strikes and so
forth, but ordinarily I start from the top, not any rigid number, counting from the
top, so I think it would be reasonably fair to say, if you want to exercise your
strikes mostly at the top, and if you're satisfied with the top, don't strike there. Id.
18. Id. The district court in Ricks also excused one individual from the alternate juror
venire. Id. After the exercise of all excusals for cause, the active juror venire contained fiftyseven individuals and the alternate juror venire contained eight individuals. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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challenges within the first twenty-nine names on the list. 2 The district court
then selected the active jurors from the original list of veniremen, which
the clerk had marked with absences, strikes for cause, and peremptory
challenges. 2 The district court selected all twelve of the active jurors from
below the point on the list where the defendants had executed their last
peremptory challenge.23 The defendants objected to the district court's
selection process, claiming that the district court misled the defendants by
stating that the selection of the jurors would start from the top of the
venire list.Y The defendants argued that if the district court had explained
that the court intended to select the active jurors from all parts of the
venire list, the defendants would not have concentrated the use of their
peremptory strikes at the top of the list.25 The court replied that the
defendants were not told that the selection of active jurors would begin at
the top of the list.26 Instead, the court said that the defendants were told
that the selection of active jurors might begin at the top of the list.27
Accordingly, the district court overruled the defendants' objections, and
swore in the jury. 8 Following the trial, the jury found the defendants guilty
of the narcotics charges. 29 The defendants appealed the convictions to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.30 On appeal, a panel

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The district court in Ricks selected as foreman the fifteenth individual named on
the master venire list whom the district court had not struck for cause, and whom neither side
had peremptorily challenged. Id. The district court then selected the remaining eleven active
jurors from individuals whose names were below the foreman's name on the venire list. Id.
24. Id. In Ricks the defense argued that, relying on the words of the district court judge,
the defense started at the first name on the venire list and proceeded to strike the twelve most
potentially hostile individuals in order from the top to the bottom, rather then strike the most
hostile twelve individuals on the list. Id.
25. Id. at 460. In Ricks the counsel for the defense stated that the defense decided not
to strike the individual who became the jury foreman from the venire list because the defense
believed that the court would start selecting jurors from the top of the list and, therefore, the
district court would not reach the foreman's name. Id. According to the defense, even if the
government took six strikes and the defense took twelve, the district court would not have
reached the foreman's name if the court had started selecting from the top of the list. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The district court in Ricks responded to the defendants' objection to the jury
selection by saying that although the trial court suggested that the defendants should exercise
strikes near the top, the trial court never stated a rigid formula of selection. Id. The defendants
replied that it was not coincidence that all nine of the defense attorneys thought that the trial
judge said that jury selection would begin at the top of the list and work down. Id. The
prosecution responded that although the defense counsel did not understand the court's
statements, the prosecution had understood the court's statements. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 458. The district court in Ricks convicted Ricks, Carter, Moffatt, Rogers,
Lindsey, Frisby, Roberts, and King of engaging in a conspiracy to possess and distribute
heroin and cocaine. Id.; see supra note 15 (discussing specific crimes with which prosecution
charged defendants).
30. United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1985), 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986)
(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 650.
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of the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's misleading explanation
of the Ricks struck jury selection process impaired the defendants' ability
to fully exercise their peremptory challenges." The panel held that the
impairment of the defendants' ability to exercise their peremptory challenges
was reversible error.3 2 The United States appealed the Fourth Circuit's panel
decision, and the Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc.33
On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit in Ricks noted that the history of the
struck jury selection process requires a struck jury venire to contain no
more individuals than the sum of the minimum number of people necessary
to form a petit jury with alternate jurors, plus the number of peremptory
challenges allowed to each side.3 4 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit decided
that the district court's decision in Ricks, to employ a struck jury venire
that contained more individuals than the necessary minimum, was without
precedent." The Fourth Circuit found additionally that the Supreme Court

31. Id. at 461. The Fourth Circuit in Ricks found that the ambiguity of the district
court's explanation of the struck jury selection process made the defendants' peremptory
challenges worthless because all of the defendants' challenges were against individuals whom
the trial court never considered for selection. Id.
32. Id. In Ricks the Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court declared in United
States v. Pointer that a denial or impairment of a party's right to peremptory challenges is
per se reversible error. Id.; United States v. Pointer, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894). Accordingly,
the panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the defendants' convictions. Ricks, 776 F.2d at 461.
While the Fourth Circuit did not find any precedent that was precisely on point with the Ricks
decision, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Ricks decision was in accord with other federal
court decisions. Ricks, 776 F.2d at 461 n. 9.; see e.g. United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 535,
538 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that ambiguous exchange resulting in misunderstanding between
court and counsel concerning court's own jury selection process was automatic reversible error
when court did not give defendant adequate notice of which jury selection process court would
employ and misunderstanding resulted in impairment of defendant's peremptory challenges);
United States v. Sams, 470 F.2d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that clerk impaired defendant's
ability to fully exercise peremptory challenges when clerk misled defense counsel concerning
which jury selection system court would employ).
33. United States v. Ricks, 784 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1986).
34. United States v. Ricks, 802 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied sub
nom. King v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 650. In Ricks the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Pointer v. U.S. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 733, 735; see
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 405-13 (1894). In Pointerthe trial court restricted the
size of the trial venire to the number of people in the petit jury (12), plus the total number
of peremptory challenges (15), that each side could exercise under state statute. Pointer, 151
U.S. at 399. The Fourth Circuit found that other circuit courts have limited struck jury venires
to the sum of the petit jurors plus the total number of peremptory strikes. Ricks, 802 F.2d
at 736. The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the decision by the Pointer trial court,
to use a venire containing no more then the necessary minimum number of individuals, was
not accidental, but rather a reflection of the custom of conducting struck jury selection from
a venire which contains only the minimium number of names necessary to cover the petit jury
and the peremptory challenges. Id.
35. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 736. The Fourth Circuit in Ricks concluded that because every
case which explained the struck jury process in numerical terms limited the venire to the sum
of the jurors, plus the peremptory challenges, the district court in Ricks was without precedent
in deciding to tender a longer list without designating an area on the list equal to the necessary
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has condemned every system of jury selection that impairs a party's right
to full unrestricted exercise of the party's peremptory challenges.3 6 According
to the Fourth Circuit, a struck jury venire that contains more individuals
than the necessary minimum automatically impairs the effectiveness of a
party's peremptory challengesY The Fourth Circuit, therefore, reversed the
3 8
defendants' convictions in Ricks and remanded the case for a new trial.
In remanding Ricks, the Fourth Circuit enunciated two rules that future
courts must follow when employing the struck jury selection process.3 9 The
Fourth Circuit stated that courts must limit the number of people in a
struck jury venire to the necessary mimimum. 4° The Fourth Circuit also
stated, that if a court fails to limit the size of a struck jury venire to the
necessary minimum, the court must designate an area on the struck jury
venire list that contains a number of names equal to the necessary minimum
and select the jurors from that part of the list. 41 According to the Fourth

minimum. Id. Additionally, the Ricks panel had reasoned previously that the Ricks venire
only needed thirty-eight individuals, instead of the fifty-seven individuals that actually comprised
the Ricks venire. Ricks, 776 F.2d at 459. The Ricks panel had calculated this number by
adding together the number of jurors in the petit jury (12), plus the number of alternate jurors
(4), plus the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the defendants (12), plus the number
of peremptory challenges allowed to the government (6), plus the total number of peremptory
challenges against the alternate jury venire (4): a total of 38 individuals. Ricks, 776 F.2d at
459.
36. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 734. The Fourth Circuit based its reversal in Ricks on the Supreme
Court's opinion in Pointer v. United States. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 734; see United States v.
Pointer, 151 U.S. 396, 408. The Pointer Court stated unequivocally that courts must condemn
any system of jury selection that prevents or embarrasses the full unrestricted exercise by an
accused of his peremptory challenges. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 408.
37. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 733. According to the en banc panel in Ricks, the effectivenness
of the right to exercise peremptory challenges decreases as the size of the venire list increases.Id.
The Fourth Circuit reached this decision by concluding that if a court employs a struck jury
venire list that contains more names than the necessary minimum and the judge selects the
jury in a way that differs from the manner that the judge previously disclosed, the defendant
could waste strikes on veniremen whom the judge ultimately would decide to exclude from
the jury. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the district court's use of an
excessively large venire diluted the defendants' ability to fully exercise their peremptory
challenges. Id. at 736.
38. Id.at 737.
39. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's new rules
in Ricks limiting number of individuals'allowed in struck jury venires).
40. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 736-37. In deciding that a court must limit the size of a struck
jury venire to the necessary minimum, the en banc panel in Ricks based its decision on the
history of the struck jury selection process. See supra note 34 (discussing traditional size of
struck jury venires).
41. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 737. The Fourth Circuit found the authority for requiring courts
to designate expressly an area on an overly large venire equal in size to the necessary minimum
number of people needed for trial in Pointer v. United States. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 735-36; see
Pointer, 151 U.S. at 409-11. The Fourth Circuit noted that although the Pointer decision did
not state that a trial court must inform the defendant and the prosecutor that the first twelve
unchallenged names will become the jury, the Pointer Court had approved of a struck jury
system in which the trial court had informed both sides of the selection order. Ricks, 802 F.2d
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Circuit, the failure of a court to follow the venire restrictions established
42
in Ricks is reversible error.
The dissent in Ricks noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a party's right to peremptory challenges is a right to reject jurors
but not a right to select jurors. 43 The dissent argued that the majority's
new venire rules allow a party to exercise more control over the selection
of a jury than the Supreme Court allows. 44 The dissent also argued that
the majority's new venire rules usurp control of the jury empanelling process
that the Supreme Court traditionally has left to the discretion of the
individual courts. 45 Finally, the dissent feared that the majority's rules would
decrease the ability of a court to empanel impartial juries and decrease the
46
likelihood that a jury contains adequate minority representation.

at 735-36; see Pointer, 151 U.S. at 409-11. The Fourth Circuit found that the explanation of
the selection order by the Pointer trial court was a significant factor in the Supreme Court's
decision to validate the jury selection process in Pointer. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 736. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that if a struck jury venire contains more names than the necessary minimum,
the only way to protect the parties' rights to fully exercise their peremptory challenges is to
provide the functional equivalent of a limited venire by requiring courts to designate the
portion of the oversized venire from which the courts will select the jurors. Id.at 736-37.
42. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 737.
43. Id. at 738 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The dissent in Ricks relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Marchant for the proposition that the right to peremptorily
challenge persons in a venire is not a right to select jurors, but rather is only the right to
reject jurors. Id.; see United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 482 (1827) (stating
that defendant's common law right to peremptorily challenge jurors does not extend so far as
to grant defendant right to control actual make-up of final trial venire).
44. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 739 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The dissent in Ricks stated that
a substantial number of courts have held that a party cannot successfully claim that a court
impaired the party's peremptory challenges simply by showing that the party could have
exercised its peremptory challenges in a more effective manner. Id. The dissent concluded,
therefore, that the majority's decision in Ricks ignores this precedent by allowing the defendants
to challenge the size of the Ricks venire. Id.
45. Id. at 739 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The dissent in Ricks noted that the Supreme
Court encouraged experimentation with the jury selection process by intentionally leaving
control of the process in the hands of the district courts. Id. at 738. The dissent noted
additionally that Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure says nothing about venire
size, nor does Rule 24 address any relationship between the size of the venire and the number
of peremptory challenges. Id.; see FaD. R. CRm. P. 24 (b) (revealing absence of language in
Federal Rules concerning venire size). According to the dissent, the majority did not acknowledge the flexibility in empanelling juries that the Supreme Court traditionally has entrusted to
the district courts. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 739. The dissent stated further that appellate courts
should not impose their own preferences for specific jury selection procedures on the lower
courts. Id. According to the dissent, the result of the Ricks venire rules is the substitution of
appellate fiat for trial court flexibility. Id.
46. 802 F.2d at 739-40 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). The dissent in Ricks relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana. Id; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
527 (1975). In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross-section of the court's community is an essential component of the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527. According to the Ricks dissent, a
large venire enhances the likelihood that the jury will include a fair cross-section of the
community. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 739. Thus, the Ricks dissent feared that the majority's decision
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The Fourth Circuit's decision to reverse the Ricks district court because
the district court impaired the defendants' ability to exercise the defendants'
peremptory challenges is in accord with the Supreme Court's protection of
peremptory challenges. 47 The Supreme Court has held that a denial or
impairment of a party's ability to exercise peremptory challenges is reversible

error without a showing of prejudice. 48 In Ricks, the district court misled

the defense counsel by stating that the jury selection would begin near the
top of the venire list. 49 By misleading the defense counsel, the district court
impaired the ability of the defense counsel to exercise its peremptory
challenges.50 Thus, based on the facts in Ricks, the Fourth Circuit's decision

to reverse the Ricks district court is in accord with the Supreme Court's
51
protection of an accused's right to peremptory challenges.
The Fourth Circuit's reversal of the Ricks district court also accords

with the State Code and common law of Maryland. 52 The Supreme Court
has left the process of jury empanellment to the complete discretion of the

individual district courts so long as the district courts do not impair the

to restrict the size of struck jury venires underestimates the value of an impartial jury and
decreases the possibility that a struck jury will contain minority members. Id.
47. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing accord between Fourth
Circuit's decision in Ricks and Supreme Court's protection of accused's rights to peremptory
challenges).
48. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1964) (holding that any impairment of
peremptory challenges necessitates reversal); see also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,
376 (1892) (same).
49. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Ricks court's statements to
Assisstant United States Attorney). The Assisstant United States Attorney expressly asked the
trial court if the jury selection would start from the top of the list. Ricks, 776 F.2d at 459.
The trial court answered that ordinarily the court starts at the top. Id. The court also suggested
that the parties should exercise their strikes at the top of the list. Id. Thus, the defense
counsel's assumption that the court would conduct the selection from the top to the bottom
was reasonable. Id.
50. Id. When the trial court in Ricks selected the jurors from the master venire list, the
court did not select a single juror from the first fourteen un-challenged individuals. Id. If
the defendants had known that the court would not select even one juror from the first
fourteen eligible individuals, the defendants would not have concentrated all of their peremptory
challenges at the top of the list. Id at 460 & n. 7. Thus, by relying on the court's comments
that selection would begin at the top of the list, the defendants used all of their challenges in
an area from which the court ultimately selected no jurors. Id. The Fourth Circuit's reversal
of the defendants' convictions on the factual basis that the trial court's ambiguous comments
about the selection process impaired the defendant's use of peremptory challenges accords with
the decisions of other courts. See Spencer v. State, 20 Md.App. 201, 314 A.2d 727, 729-732
(Md.App. 1974) (finding that denial of due process of law occurred when clerk of court
skipped down venire list instead of following pre-arranged order of selection from top to
bottom).
51. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing how Ricks decision accords
with Supreme Court's decisions enforcing defendant's rights to unrestricted exercise of peremptory challenges).
52. See infra notes 53-57 (explaining that Ricks decision accords with Maryland Rules
of Criminal Procedure and Maryland judicial precedent that found reversible error when trial
courts deviated from previously announced venire selection orders).
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rights of the criminally accused. 3 The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that the best method of jury empanellment that a district court could

adopt may be the empanellment method of the state in which the district
court sits.14 Consequently, there appears to be no reason why the district

court in Ricks, and thereafter the Fourth Circuit in Ricks, could not have
looked to the state statutes of Maryland for authority concerning the struck
jury selection process, and the exercise of peremptory challenges. 55 The
Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure state that a trial court must explain
to both sides of a criminal proceeding the order that the court will follow
when selecting jurors from a trial venire.5 6 In response to this requirement,

the Maryland courts have held that a trial court which departs from an
57
announced venire selection order automatically commits reversible error.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit's decision to reverse the Ricks district court,

on the grounds that the district court impaired the defendants' peremptory
challenges by departing from an announced jury selection order, accords

with the state statutes and common law of Maryland.58 Based on the facts
in Ricks, therefore, the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the Ricks district court
accords with both the Supreme Court's protection and Maryland's protection

of a defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges without impair59
ment.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ricks to pronounce new struck jury
venire rules, however, does not accord with Supreme Court precedent. 60 The
53. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision to
leave control of jury empanellment in hands of individual district courts).
54. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 379 (1892). The Supreme Court in Lewis
suggested that a district court could adopt the method of jury empanellment prescribed by the
statutes of the state in which the court sits because such methods are familiar to the bar and
the people of the state. Id.
55. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court has suggested
that district courts can adopt jury empanellment statutes of states in which district courts sit).
The district court in Ricks, sat in Baltimore, Maryland. United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455
(4th Cir. 1985), 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 650.
56. See MD. RULEs 4-312(g) (directing courts to prescribe order that courts will follow
in selecting jurors from venire list before defense or prosecution exercises peremptory challenges).
57. See Spencer v. State, 20 Md. App. 201, 314 A.2d 727, 729-732 (Md. App. 1974)
(holding that trial court's departure from previously explained venire selection procedure
impaired right of accused to fully exercise accused's peremptory challenges); see also Burkett
v. State, 21 Md.App. 438, 319 A.2d 845 (Md. App. 1974) (finding that trial court's impairment
of party's peremptory challenges was reversible error without a showing of prejudice).
58. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining that Maryland courts
interpreting Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure found reversible error in same circumstances
that confronted Fourth Circuit in Ricks).
59. See supranotes 47-58 and accompanying text (explaining that Fourth Circuit's decision
to reverse Ricks trial court was correct in light of the facts in Ricks); but see infra notes 6077 and accompanying text (discussing incorrectness of Fourth Circuit's decision in Ricks to
pronounce new limitations on struck jury venires).
60. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (analyzing consequences of Ricks
decision).
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Supreme Court has given the federal courts complete discretion to control
the empanelling and designating of criminal venires so long as the federal

courts do not impair a party's ability to fully exercise its peremptory
challenges. 6' According to the Supreme Court, a party alleging that a court

acted improperly with respect to the party's peremptory challenges must
prove that the court actually impaired the party's right to full exercise of

its peremptory challenges. 62 The Ricks venire rules, however, do not require
a party alleging an impairment of peremptory challenges to prove that 63
a
court actually impaired the party's exercise of peremptory challenges.

Instead, the Ricks venire rules dictate that a court has committed reversible
error simply by employing a struck jury venire that contains more individuals
than the necessary minimum, or by failing to designate an area equal to
the necessary minimum on an overly large struck jury venire list. 4 As a
result of the Ricks venire rules, a defendant may successfully attack an
overly large struck jury venire, without proving the impairment on which
the defendant bases his attack.6 5 Consequently, if courts accept the Ricks
venire rules as binding rules of law, a criminal defendant may demand the
reversal of a criminal conviction on procedural grounds that the Supreme
Court previously has left to the discretion of the individual federal courts.6

61. See Pointer v. U.S., 151 U.S. 396, 408 (stating that authority of Circuit Courts to
control jury empanelling process is subject only to rule that selection process may not violate
rights of the accused).
62. Id. at 408.
63. See United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455, 458-61 (4th Cir. 1985), 802 F.2d 731 (4th
Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 650 (revealing
failure of Fourth Circuit in Ricks to require party alleging impairment of peremptory challenges
to actually prove impairment).
64. Id. at 736-37. As the Ricks decision now stands, in the absence of an unequivocal
designation by a trial court of the area on an overly large venire list from which the court
will select the jurors, the Fourth Circuit has declared every overly large struck jury venire
invalid. Id.
65. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (explaining that strict nature of new
Ricks venire rules grants defendants ability to attack struck jury venires without requiring
defendant to prove actual impairment of peremptory challenges).
66. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (explaining that new venire limits
pronounced by Fourth Circuit in Ricks usurp control over jury empanelling process that
Supreme Court traditionally left to discretion of individual federal courts).
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Marchant held that an individual's
right to peremptory challenges is only a right to reject jurors, not a right to select jurors.
United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 297, 298-99. Additionally, the Second Circuit
in United States v. Blouin has stated that a defendant cannot claim that a court impaired his
right to peremptory challenges, simply by alleging that there was some other procedure available
to the court, that would have increased the effectiveness of the defendant's peremptory
challenges. United States v. )Blouin, 666 F.2d 796, 798 (2nd Cir. 1981). Thus, the Supreme
Court, and the Second Circuit have refused to invade the right of a federal court to control
the exercise of peremptory challenges without a showing that a court actually impaired a
party's right to peremptory challenges. See also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 377-79
(1892). The United States Supreme Court in Lewis left the control of the jury empanelling
process to the individual circuit courts, subject only to the condition that a court could not
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The Ricks venire rules conflict additionally with a defendant's sixth
amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. 67 The Supreme Court has

held that an essential part of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is
that courts must conduct jury selection from a trial venire that represents

a cross-section of the community. 68 According to the Ricks venire rules,
however, a court cannot employ a large struck jury venire to ensure an
adequate cross-section of individuals from the local community. 69 Moreover,
violate the rights of an accused. Id.
Less then ten months after the Fourth Circuit decided Ricks, the Second Circuit in United
States v. Resto addressed the Ricks venire rules. United States v. Resto, 824 F.2d 210, 213 n.
1. (2nd Cir. 1987). In Resto the trial court conducted two jury selections from a single master
venire. Id. The master venire contained fifty people. Id. After the trial court completed the
drawing of jurors for the first trial, twenty-nine people remained in the master venire which
then became the Resto trial venire. Id. The trial court in Resto granted the defendant ten
peremptory challenges and the government six peremptory challeneges. Id. The petit jury in
Resto contained twelve individuals. Id. According to the Fourth Circuit in Ricks, the Resto
venire should have contained no more then twenty-eight individuals. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text (explaining that under Ricks venire rules, Resto venire should contain twelve
individuals to equal twelve petit jurors, plus ten individuals to equal defendant's ten peremptory
challenges, plus six individuals to equal government's six peremptory challenges for a total of
twenty-eight individuals). The trial court in Resto, however, used all twenty-nine individuals
in the Resto venire. Resto, 824 F.2d at 213. According to the Ricks venire rules, the Resto
venire contained more individuals than the necessary minimum, and consequently, the Resto
trial court commited reversible error. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (explaining
that under Ricks venire rules courts commit reversible error when struck jury venires contain
more individuals than necessary minimum). The Rsto court, however, held that despite the
existence of Ricks, the defendant could make no argument that the number of jurors in the
Resto venire was so large as to dilute the defendant's ability to exercise peremptory challenges.
Resto, 824 F.2d at 213. Thus, the conclusion of the Second Circuit in Resto appears to be
that a party cannot claim an impairment of peremptory challenges simply because a venire
contains more individuals than are necessary to try the case. Id. Although there was one
alternate juror in Resto, thereby making the size of the venire equal to the sum of the petit
jury with the alternates plus the number of peremptory challenges, the district court's decision
to designate one alternate juror appears to have been a simple response to having one more
venireman than actually was necessary. Id.
67. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing possible threat that Ricks
venire rules impose on defendant's right to impartial jury)
68. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (holding that defendant's sixth
amendment right to trial by jury requires that courts conduct jury selection from venire
containing adequate representation of cross-sections of community).
69. See supra notes 35 & 40-41 and accompanying text (explaining technical requirements
of Ricks venire rules). Under the Ricks venire rules, a court never can conduct a struck jury
selection from a venire that contains more individuals than the necessary minimum, because
when a struck jury venire contains more individuals than the necessary minimum the court
must restrict the selection to a part of the venire that does not contain more individuals than
the necessary minimum. Id. See also United States v. Ricks, 802 F.2d 731, 739 (Wilkinson,
J., dissenting) (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States, 107 S.
Ct. 650. In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson stated that the United States Supreme Court in Ballew
v. Georgia, noted that a small jury panel is unlikely to allow adequate minority participation.
Ricks, 802 F.2d at 739 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 23637 (1978) (noting minority representation decreases as size of jury panel decreases). According
to the dissent in Ricks, the same decrease in minority representation occurs when the size of
a trial venire decreases. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 740 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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if a court employs a large struck jury venire to protect a defendant's right
to an impartial jury, and the venire does not impair the defendant's full
exercise of peremptory challenges, the Ricks decision would require a reversal
of the defendant's conviction. 70 Thus, by proscribing overly large struck
jury venires, without requiring proof of impairment, the Ricks venire rules
impede the ability of a court to protect a defendant's sixth amendment
71
right to an impartial jury.
Despite the strict nature and plenary force of the Ricks venire rules,
the Fourth Circuit's decision to pronounce new limitations on struck jury
venires was without authority.7 2 The Supreme Court has stated expressly
that the authority to control the method of jury selection is in the individual
federal courts.7 3 Additionally, unless a rule or statute specifically governs
the exercise of peremptory challenges, the right to control the exercise of
74
peremptory challenges appears to rest in the hands of the individual courts.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not prohibit a trial court from
employing a struck jury venire that contains more people than the necessary
minimum. 75 Moreover, the Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure not only
fail to prohibit a court's use of an overly large struck jury venire, but
appear to allow a court to employ an overly large struck jury venire, so
long as the venire does not impair a party's exercise of peremptory challenges.7 6 The Ricks venire rules, therefore, usurp control over the size of

70. Ricks, 802 F.2d at 737. The Fourth Circuit in Ricks held that a struck jury selection
process which employs a venire that contains more people than the necessary minimum is not
a valid struck jury system. Id.
71. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Ricks venire rules
on defendant's sixth amendment right to impartial jury).
72. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing absence of authority in
Supreme Court precedent, federal rules, and state rules, for Fourth Circuit's new venire rules).
73. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 397, 411 (1893). See supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision to give individual federal courts
control over jury selection process so long as courts do not impair rights of accused).
74. See III A.B.A. STaARs FOR CaM. J sT. § 15-2.6(c) (1982) (stating that although
there is a need for uniformity in jury selection systems, in absence of statutes or rules
controlling exercise of jury selection process, individual courts have authority to control
selection process).

75. See FED R. CIM. P. (24)(b). Although Rule 24 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure permits both sides in criminal proceedings to exercise peremptory challenges, and
dictates the number of challenges that each side may exercise, Rule 24 does not limit the size
of venires. Id. The dissent in Ricks noted this point and stated that no rule or statute addressed
or conferred the power to control venire size that the Fourth Circuit exercised in Ricks. Ricks,
802 F.2d at 738 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
76. See MD. Ru_.as 4-312(g). The Maryland Rules state that after strikes for cause, and
after both sides have exercised their peremptory challenges against the names on a venire list,
the number of jurors in the venire list must be sufficent to provide the number of jurors and
alternates needed to try the case Id. Thus, although the Maryland rules state that a venire
must contain a minimum number of people, the Maryland rules do not impose a requirement
that a venire cannot contain more than the minimum number of people necessary for a trial.
Id.
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struck jury venires from the individual federal courts without any authority
77
for exercising such control.
In United States v. Ricks, the Fourth Circuit found that the district
court's use of an overly large venire impermissibly diluted the defendants'
right to fully exercise their peremptory challenges. 7 The Ricks Court held
that courts employing the struck jury selection process must limit the size
of a struck jury venire to the sum of the number of individuals needed for
a petit jury with alternates, plus the total number of peremptory challenges
allowed in the case. 79 The Ricks court additionally held that a court that
does not limit the size of a struck jury venire to the necessary minimum
must designate an area on the venire list equal in size to the necessary
minimum and confine the selection of jurors to that area.8 0 The Fourth
Circuit's decision to reverse the district court is sound under the facts in
Ricks.s1 The venire rules that the Fourth Circuit's pronounces in Ricks,
however, establish new requirements for courts to follow in areas of the
law that the Supreme Court traditionally has left to the discretion of the
individual federal courts. 82 The Ricks venire rules also impede the ability of
a trial court to protect a defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury.83
Moreover, despite the strict nature and plenary force of the Ricks venire
rules, the Ricks venire rules lack precedential authority. 4 Consequently, the
Ricks court's decision to establish new limitations on struck jury venires in
the Fourth Circuit, stands on tenuous authority and in conflict with the
express precedent of the United States Supreme Court.85
EDWARD SKINNER MADARA, III

77. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (explaining that Ricks venire rules
remove control of jury empanelling process from individual courts without authority for
removing control).
78. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (explaining Fourth Circuit's decision
to reverse defendants' convictions in Ricks).
79. See supra notes 34 & 40 and accompanying text (explaining Fourth Circuit's limitations on size of struck jury venires).
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining Fourth Circuit's requirement
for courts to follow if struck jury venires contain more people than necessary minimum).
81. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (noting that, based on facts in Ricks,
Fourth Circuit's decision agrees with Supreme Court's protection of accused's right to fully
exercise accused's peremptory challenges).
82. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (explaining that Ricks venire rules
usurp control over jury empanelling process traditionally left to discretion of individual district
courts by United States Supreme Court).
83. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing that, because Ricks venire
rules prohibit courts from employing struck jury venires with more people than necessary
minimum, Ricks venire rules conflict with sixth amendment right to impartial jury).
84. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing absence of statutory or
precedential authority in Maryland law, Federal Rules, or Supreme Court precedent for Ricks
venire rules).
85. See supra notes 60-66 & 72-77 and accompanying text (noting lack of authority
behind Ricks venire rules, and potential conflict with individual federal court's jury empanelment discretion if courts accept Ricks venire rules as binding law).

